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The goal of this thesis is to explore the legal foundations of privacy and analyze 
the ways in which societal and technological advancements have influenced the 
progression of privacy rights. With regard to the significant breadth of privacy issues, 
the scope of this thesis is narrowed to primarily focus on the informational aspects of 
privacy along with some analysis of physical seclusion as it relates to the confidentiality 
of the details of one’s personal life.  
Beginning with the Fourth Amendment and moving through an analysis of 
Supreme Court decisions, I establish a timeline of how the right to privacy developed 
and what forces were most influential in shaping its trajectory. I also examine the legal 
doctrines that are currently guiding privacy rights, and I explore the ways in which they 
are succeeding or failing to address the norms and expectations of individuals in the 
digital age. These include issues that are presently arising in the areas of large scale data 
collection, increased connectivity and information sharing, and national security. I 
explore the foundational causes of issues in these areas as well as their lasting effects, 
both tangible and psychological. 
  
iii  
Through my exploration of the existing jurisprudence, I analyze the factors that 
shaped the development of privacy rights. I use this historical background in assessing 
the current issues facing the future of privacy protections. I identify four areas of 
particular concern: (1) the increasingly difficult balance of privacy and security, (2) the 
inadequate adaptation of aging legal doctrines, (3) troubling issues of access to 
information, including the disproportionate access that the government and certain 
business entities have relative to most private individuals, combined with trends toward 
further consolidation of information and the entanglement of government surveillance 
programs with private information gathering which will further widen the divide as well 
as diminish transparency, (4) and finally, the changing psychological aspects of privacy. 
In addressing each of these areas, I identify causes, effects, and possible courses of 
action that will help advance the framework of privacy rights to fit the digital age while 
balancing competing needs: adequate protection for private citizens, and necessary tools 
and abilities for the government to ensure the safety of its citizens. 
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Introduction 
 
Why are Privacy Rights Important? 
How important is privacy to the average American citizen? How important is 
privacy to the function of democracy? What levels of protection can be reasonably 
expected by those who seek to prevent the unwanted discovery of private information? 
How do the security interests of the government impact the protection of the American 
ideals of individualism and privacy? These questions challenge the progress and 
identity of America. Politicians, legal scholars, civil liberties advocates, and Supreme 
Court justices all struggle to evaluate these questions and develop adequate answers.  
While it is generally understood that privacy is an essential element of modern 
life, it is difficult to fully describe why it is of such importance and how we should go 
about ensuring its protection. Privacy is a broad concept that can be concretely 
described in terms of seclusion and concealment; however, upon a deeper exploration it 
is clear that it expands beyond simply physical characteristics. The notion of privacy 
also includes psychological aspects that encompass individuality and personal 
autonomy, which are grounded in the peace of mind that one is free from unwanted 
intrusions or disturbances in their personal life, as well as unnecessary limitations and 
confinements on one’s personal liberties. Both of these aspects are essential to the larger 
idea of privacy, regardless of the situational factors in which they exist. The tangible 
elements of privacy are crucial to protecting information, while the psychological 
elements are fundamental to ensuring the independence of the individual. In a 
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democracy such as the United States of America, each of these aspects of privacy plays 
a crucial role in facilitating the proper functioning of a representative democracy and 
the maintenance of our core values. 
The right to privacy is not a right that has been specifically outlined in the 
Constitution or its Amendments; nor has it been a right that has existed with a singular 
or static definition. It has been exposed to the ever-changing tides of societal norms and 
technological development, expanding and contracting over decades and shaped by the 
actions of the Supreme Court and Congress. This progression of the relationship 
between technology, society, government, and law has been fascinating. However, in 
recent years, a worrisome gap has developed between the legal framework used to 
evaluate infringements on individuals’ privacy rights and the realities of the societal 
environment in which this framework is expected to operate. Most judicial precedent 
and legal theories that have been foundational in the development and evaluation of 
privacy rights predate the technological advancements that are the source of the current 
issues revolving around the protection of privacy. Some of these judicial precedents and 
legal theories have become fundamentally inadequate for their roles in evaluating 
current issues such as government surveillance and personal data protection. Recently 
the Supreme Court has faced increasing criticism and skepticism regarding the judicial 
precedents it has established. Concerned scholars and critics have brought attention to 
expanding invasions of privacy by government agents and decreased protections for 
citizens. The growing chorus of fear and distrust has set the stage for another round of 
landmark Supreme Court decisions.   
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Privacy Rights: The Foundations and Core Principles 
 
Early Ideas of Privacy 
The issues surrounding what have become known as “privacy rights” stretch 
from their origins in limited legal discussions of the late 1800’s, to current national 
debates of legal rights, technological possibilities, and personal values. Privacy 
occupies a unique position within American legal history because it lacks the explicit 
constitutional support that many of our other foundational rights possess. In fact, the 
word “privacy” never actually appears in the Constitution. Therefore, legal scholars 
have drawn upon the language of other rights within the Constitution to find “the right 
to be left alone,” which eventually developed into “the right to privacy.”1 This notion of 
a constitutional right being found in the language of other, more specifically defined 
rights began in the late 1800s. However, Justice Douglas’ majority opinion in the much 
more recent Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) case offers an accurate encapsulation of the 
“penumbras and emanations” approach that has long been central to the developing 
notion of privacy rights: 
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance… Various guarantees create zones of 
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First 
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment, in its 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of 
peace without the consent of the owner, is another facet of that privacy. 
The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment, in its Self-Incrimination                                                         
1 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193  
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Clause, enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government 
may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment 
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” 2 
 
The lack of an explicitly defined right to privacy has allowed for a continuous, if at 
times inconsistent, development of the notion that individuals have a justifiable interest 
in protection from unwanted inquiry and discovery of personal information.  
The right to privacy is a foundational element of our civil liberties in that it 
establishes protections intended to shield citizens from excessive government intrusion 
into their lives and provide citizens with a reasonable expectation that they control 
access to their personal information. It helps protect the autonomy and individualism 
that are among the core elements of the American conscience and are essential 
psychological aspects of democracy. As highlighted by George Orwell’s dystopian 
novel, 1984, without adequate privacy protections we risk surrendering our 
psychological and personal autonomy as well as our essential civil liberties at the hands 
of increasingly complex government control and manipulation efforts. The 
psychological importance of privacy to the successful function of democracy cannot be 
ignored; therefore, privacy is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. As discussed in 
McDonald v. Chicago, a right that is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution can 
gain constitutional stature if it is believed to be “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” meaning that it is “essential to free government and to the maintenance of 
democratic institutions.”3  
                                                        
2 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 484 (1965) 
3 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 745-747 (2010)  
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The Fourth Amendment 
As reflected in the Fourth Amendment, the most basic tenet of the right to 
privacy is the Constitutionally guaranteed right of the people to be secure in their 
“persons, papers, houses, and effects” and to be protected against “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.” When it was written, the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
primarily protect against physical intrusion by government agents, or other citizens 
loosely acting as law enforcement officers (which was common at the time).4 The 
intrusions that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect against were those 
experienced at the time, namely intrusions into one’s home or searches through one’s 
personal effects. Physical invasions upon property and possessions were the primary 
concern long before issues of electronic data collection and surveillance became 
relevant.5 To protect against excessive physical intrusions, the framers of the Fourth 
Amendment stated that such acts were illegal without obtaining a judicial warrant 
specifically stating the intent, goal, and scope of the proposed search.6  
The purpose of a warrant is to ensure a check on police power and act as a 
safeguard against unjust intrusions. It requires police officers and other government 
agents to give a preliminary description of the search and upon review by an 
independent judge receive approval of the proposed search.7 Before approving a 
warrant request, a detached and neutral magistrate is required to confirm that the 
                                                        
4 Barry Friedman and Orin Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment” National Constitution Center 
https://constitutioncenter.org  
5 “Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure – History and Scope of the Amendment” Justia U.S. Law 
law.justia.com  
6 “Search Warrants: What They Are and When They’re Necessary” Nolo http://www.nolo.com 
7 “Warrants”  SearchandSeizure.org 
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requested search is reasonable and that probable cause exists to link the subject of the 
search to illegal activity.8 The language of the Fourth Amendment reflects the realities 
of the threats that existed in 1789 when the it was written.9 Over time, this language has 
been liberally construed to include not only protections for the physical confines of 
one’s house, but also protections from intrusions into data, digital communications, and 
even aspects of one’s personal liberty and identity.  
 
                                                        
8 “Search Warrants: What They Are and When They’re Necessary” Nolo  http://www.nolo.com  
9 Barry Friedman and Orin Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment” National Constitution Center 
https://constitutioncenter.org  
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  The Progression of Privacy Rights: Development of Doctrines by the 
United States Supreme Court  
 
Introducing a Liberal Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
Early common law rights were relatively simple and protected primarily against 
wrongs committed against a person or his possessions. The closest thing to privacy 
rights were protections against physical intrusion upon a person’s life or his property.10 
Under early understandings of common law, the right to life protected against various 
forms of physical battery; the right to liberty protected against unjust restraint or 
imprisonment; and finally the right to property secured a man’s control over his land 
and physical possessions.11 These basic rights were the same general principles that had 
been previously established in England dating back centuries; however, as the modern 
era approached, these principles were expanded upon.12  
In 1886, the United States Supreme Court authored its first major opinion that 
included language encouraging the expansion of Fourth Amendment protections with 
the intent of securing the legitimate interests of “personal security, personal liberty, and 
personal property” of United States citizens.13 In the case Boyd v. United States, the 
Supreme Court addressed one of the earliest issues at the foundation of privacy rights. It 
took on the question of whether or not it was a violation of a defendant’s constitutional 
                                                        
10 Daniel J. Solove, “A Brief History of Information Privacy Law” George Washington School of Law 
(See pages 1-11 for an early history of privacy law and an understanding of related common law) (2006) 
11 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193 
12 See: Albert Kiralfy, Andrew Lewis, Mary Glendon, “Common Law” Encyclopedia Britannica 
(August 5, 2016) https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-law (The definition and 
description of common law) 
13 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
 
 
8  
rights to compel him to comply with a prosecutor’s requests that he turn over any 
private books, documents, or papers under the threat that if he did not comply, all 
allegations would be assumed as true. The Court decided unanimously that the forced 
production of a man’s private papers amounted to a violation of both his Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment rights. Justice Bradley concluded that compelling a man to turn over 
his private papers was essentially the same as conducting a warrantless seizure of the 
papers and therefore violated his Fourth Amendment right against unwarranted search 
and seizure. He also argued that forcing a defendant to turn over such papers caused 
him to effectively become a witness against himself, thus violating his Fifth 
Amendment right protecting him from forcibly becoming a witness against himself in a 
court of law.14  
Justice Bradley understood that this decision would have a lasting impact on the 
position of the Court regarding Fourth Amendment privacy issues as well as its attitude 
towards protecting the personal privacies of citizens, and he was therefore particularly 
intentional with the wording and scope of his argument. He clearly and concisely 
articulated the core elements of his argument:  
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete 
form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious 
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government 
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of 
life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers 
that constitutes the essence of the offence, but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of 
some public offence.15                                                         
14 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886) 
15 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) 
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Justice Bradley’s clear view that it is not strictly the breaking down of doors and the 
rummaging of papers that constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but rather 
that it is any form of invasion upon “the privacies of life,” meaning an individual’s 
personal security, liberty, or property, is of the utmost importance because it greatly 
expands the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Declaring the compelled production of 
personal papers as tantamount to a physical intrusion effectively equates the severity of 
each offense and consequently recognizes that threats to personal privacy are not 
limited to physical invasion by government agents. Justice Bradley’s opinion helped 
begin the expansion of the legal understanding of personal privacy as a constitutional 
right. 
The lasting effect of this case was to encourage a liberal interpretation of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, with the purpose of protecting the right to personal 
security and personal liberty, as was believed to be intended by the framers of the 
Fourth Amendment. This precedent is particularly important because it encourages the 
expansion of the sphere of privacy beyond the limited scope of the protections explicitly 
stated in the Fourth Amendment. Although it did not affect an immediate and complete 
shift in the Court’s views on the issue, this decision was a key moment for the Supreme 
Court in that it acknowledged the existence and importance of privacy rights beyond 
merely the scope of physical intrusion on private residences and conducting searches of 
papers and files. 
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Warren and Brandeis: “The Right to be Let Alone” 
Four years later, the notion of privacy rights was explored in detail in “The 
Right to Privacy,” an article authored by influential legal scholars Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. In the article, 
Warren and Brandeis delved deep into the early roots of common law as they built an 
argument for a right to privacy. Together, they formulated an argument on the basis that 
the progression of established legal principles and doctrines had broadened to include a 
“right to be let alone.” 16  
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis recognized the need to acknowledge and 
protect a person’s spiritual and intellectual being. Gradually the understanding of basic 
legal principles began to expand to match the increasing sophistication of contemporary 
societies. Basic rights such as the rights to life, liberty, and property progressively 
encompassed more than simply the bare minimum required for an individual’s survival. 
The understanding of the right to life expanded to mean the right to enjoy life and 
slowly incorporated various protections of a person’s means of enjoying and fulfilling 
his ambitions in life.17 The interpretation of the right to liberty progressed to include 
civil liberties that protected against much more than unjust imprisonment.18 The right to 
property transformed beyond merely a protection of one’s land, but also his work and 
his intellectual property.19 Warren and Brandeis were instrumental in beginning the 
expansion of these core tenets of common law, that are at the foundation of our legal 
                                                        
16 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193 
17 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193 
18 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193 
19 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 193 
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system, in a way that has encouraged them to evolve alongside the ever-changing 
demands of our society. 
Their concern at the time was the increasingly invasive nature of the press and 
the media. With the growing use of cameras and the publication of private pictures and 
stories in newspapers, the authors identified these actions as an invasion of one’s 
personal rights and deserving of legal redress.20 Warren, in particular, was concerned 
with the growing means of invading a person’s “social privacy,” and he felt strongly 
that there existed a significant community interest in preventing such warrantless 
invasions upon the private lives of the citizens.21 They articulated this interest as “the 
right to be let alone,” which protected “the individual from invasion either by the too 
enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other modern device for 
rewording or reproducing scenes or sounds” except regarding any matters that may be 
of a legitimate public interest.22 Warren and Brandeis argued that this right of the 
individual to be left alone was substantial and therefore ought to be recognized and 
enforced by the courts.23  
Through their unique interpretation and expansion of the existing foundation of 
tort and common law, which accounted for injuries such as trespass, nuisance, and 
invasion of privacy, they laid the groundwork of the legal protections of the privacy of 
individuals. Rather than base the foundation of their concerns in the existing spheres of 
                                                        
20 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 206 
21 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 214 
22 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 206 
23 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 
196-197  
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contract, libel, property, or trademark law, they argued that it is an individual’s more 
general right to be left alone that protects them from such invasions.  
We must therefore conclude that the rights, so protected, whatever their 
exact nature, are not rights arising from contract or from special trust, but 
are rights as against the world; and, as above stated, the principle which 
has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the principle of 
private property, unless that word be used in an extended and unusual 
sense. The principle which protects personal writings and any other 
productions of the intellect of or the emotions, is the right to privacy, and 
the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection 
to the personal appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, 
domestic or otherwise. 24 
 
They favored an expansion of existing privacy protections, such that the new 
understanding of privacy would acknowledge the rights of the individual and expand 
the protection of his interests beyond merely those of his physical body or property. 
Warren and Brandeis’ article was the beginning of the development of the right to 
privacy.25 Their argument placed privacy rights in the realm of civil tort law, as a 
protection of the individual against invasions by his peers, rather than a constitutionally 
grounded restriction against government intrusion. Incorporating the Constitution and 
applying the right against the government was not the primary goal of Warren and 
Brandeis’ article. 
 
                                                        
24 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no. 5 (1890) : 213 
25 Dorothy J. Glancy, “The invention of the right to privacy” Arizona Law Review vol. 4, no. 1 (1979) : 1 
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Establishing the Trespass Doctrine: A Property Based Approach 
Despite the development of a liberal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in 
the Boyd decision and the advocacy of the “eternal youth”26 of common law in “The 
Right to Privacy,” the progression of the right to privacy was not straightforward and at 
times it even took steps backwards. Forty years later, the Supreme Court again 
addressed the issue of privacy, this time favoring a conservative view of the law. In the 
1928 decision, Olmstead v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not protect against warrantless wiretaps placed on phone lines located outside the 
perimeter of the suspect’s private property. The majority opinion reasoned that wiretaps 
do not physically invade upon the individual’s home or his privacy and therefore do not 
violate his or her constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.27 This 
decision essentially tied a person’s privacy to a particular location, namely their home, 
establishing physical trespass as the determining factor when evaluating a possible 
invasion of one’s privacy. This subsequently became known as the “trespass doctrine” 
and guided the progression of privacy rights for decades. 
Although the majority decision signaled a shift away from the views expressed 
in the Boyd case and “The Right to Privacy” article, Louis Brandeis, former co-author 
of “The Right to Privacy” and now a sitting justice on the Supreme Court, used the 
opportunity to author a highly influential dissenting opinion. In his dissent, Justice 
Brandeis attacked the Olmstead majority’s narrow interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment and argued that the Amendment’s protections should extend to telephone 
                                                        
26 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review vol. 4, no. 5 (1890) : 
193 
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) 
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conversations conducted in private, just as conversations between two people within the 
confines of a home were protected. His dissent highlighted the changes caused by the 
incorporation of a new technology, such as telephones, and argued that the rule of law 
must expand and adapt or risk failing to offer the protections intended by the framers of 
the Constitution. Justice Brandeis asserted that the protections guaranteed by the 
Amendment were broader in scope than the literal definition of its language. In his 
view, the intent of the Fourth Amendment afforded protections beyond merely the 
physical sense spelled out in the words of the Amendment. In growing with the 
changing demands of society, it now protected a real and recognizable interest in the 
psychological wellbeing of the citizenry. He continued to advance the notion of the 
“right to be let alone,” initially expressed in “The Right to Privacy,” but in his dissent, 
he applied it to protecting against government intrusion rather than just intrusion by 
one’s peers. 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable 
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of a man’s 
spiritual nature, of his feelings, and of his intellect… They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and 
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to 
be let alone - - the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most 
valued by civilized men.28 
 
In this dissent, Justice Brandeis exhibits foresight and reasoning lacked by the other 
members of the Court. His concern for the rights of the individual, including the 
psychological aspects of the need for privacy and the need for a fluid relationship 
                                                        
28 Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) 
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between developing technologies and law helped pioneer views that would become 
increasingly relevant as the significance of these issues grew. 
 
Establishing the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test: Privacy Beyond the 
Walls of the Home  
 
After the decision in Olmstead, the adjudication of Fourth Amendment and 
privacy rights issues were primarily dictated by the Courts’ adherence to the trespass 
doctrine until the 1960’s and 1970’s when the Supreme Court began to shift its view. 
Through several key decisions, the Court departed from its strict reliance on the trespass 
doctrine and attempted to address concerns that technological and societal 
advancements were outpacing the law and leaving people unprotected. New doctrines 
such as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” and the “third-party doctrine” were 
developed to provide more accurate guidance for the courts when addressing issues of 
privacy. These changes in legal jurisprudence indicated a more comprehensive 
approach to privacy by the courts; however, in reality the results were mixed, and in 
particular situations citizens were still not afforded adequate protection under the law.  
The initial departure from the strict use of the trespass doctrine occurred in the 
case Katz v. United States in 1967. Breaking with precedent, the Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment protects people in situations in which a reasonable person would 
expect privacy, including situations that take place outside of a private residence.29 
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, crafted a pivotal opinion. Upending previously 
accepted logic, he reasoned that the Fourth Amendment’s protection of a person’s                                                         
29 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967) 
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privacy extends beyond a person’s physical location within his home and that the 
trespass doctrine could “no longer be considered controlling.”30 He argued that people 
can possess a legitimate expectation of privacy, similar to the privacy one has come to 
expect within one’s home, in places outside of their home, and that in such situations, 
the law must recognize their right to privacy. This argument is significant because, for 
the first time, the Court detached privacy from specific locations and instead attached it 
to the reasonable expectations of individuals themselves, regardless of their location. 
Thus, the door was opened for the creation of a new legal doctrine that became 
known as the “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The reasonable expectation of 
privacy is founded on the use of the “reasonable person test.” The reasonable person 
test was first developed as a standard of care to determine liability in cases of 
negligence.31 The “reasonable person” for which the test is named is, essentially, a 
composite representation of a particular community’s judgment. It is intended to help 
evaluate how a “normal” person within in the given community would be expected to 
behave based on the common views, ideals, and morals of the larger community. It is 
intended to be flexible and adaptable to changing community standards.32 This made it 
particularly appealing for application to privacy law because of its adaptability to 
changing technological and societal norms. However, this adaptability also makes it 
vulnerable to significant speculation regarding its legitimacy and effectiveness. The 
reasonable person test is also inherently susceptible to creating confusion because 
                                                        
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
31 See: “The reasonable person” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com and “Negligence” 
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com (The definitions and descriptions provided)  
32 Michael W. Price, “Rethinking privacy: Fourth Amendment “papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine” 
Journal of National Security Law and Policy Vol. 8 no. 2 (June 29, 2015) : 262 
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arguably a person does not know what to “reasonably” expect until the courts give 
grounds for the expectation, which can only happen once a particular set of events 
occurs and provides the courts a case on which they can lay the groundwork for the 
acceptable expectation.33 In theory the reasonable person test creates a flexible 
framework in which privacy can adapt to changing technologies and social norms. 
However, in practice it places a significant burden on the courts to determine what a 
person may reasonably expect, and whether this is an acceptable expectation for society 
as a whole.34 This leads to a problematic application of the doctrine that does not live up 
to its expectations of flexibility. 
In Katz, the Court examined whether or not the defendant’s rights were violated 
when government agents placed electronic listening devices on the outside of a phone 
booth he was known to frequent. The government’s argument hinged on two key points: 
that a phone booth is a public space and therefore it does not enjoy the level of privacy 
of a house, and second, that even if the phone booth is a protected space, the placement 
of the listening devices did not constitute an intrusion based on the trespass doctrine 
because they were located on the outside of the booth and did not physically intrude 
inside the phone booth.35 Conversely, the petitioner, Mr. Katz, argued that any 
reasonable person who engaged in a private phone call within the enclosure of a phone 
booth reasonably expects that there are no prying ears overhearing the conversation and 
                                                        
33 See: Michael W. Price, “Rethinking privacy: Fourth Amendment “papers” and the Third-Party 
Doctrine” Journal of National Security Law and Policy Vol. 8 no. 2 (June 29, 2015) (The discussion of 
the “reasonable expectation of privacy”) 
34 Michael W. Price, “Rethinking privacy: Fourth Amendment “papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine” 
Journal of National Security Law and Policy Vol. 8 no. 2 (June 29, 2015) : 261-262 
35 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) 
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therefore the use of listening devices intruded upon a situation in which he had a 
justifiable belief that he was not being overheard.36  
In his majority opinion, Justice Stewart guided the court to explore a new line of 
thinking, concluding that the defendant was justified in believing that he had a 
legitimate expectation that his conversations inside an enclosed phone booth would not 
be overheard or recorded by any outside persons or devices. He advised the Court to 
avoid the misplaced emphasis on the notion of a “constitutionally protected area” and 
the characterization of the phone booth as such.37 He explained, “Once this much is 
acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people -- 
and not simply "areas" -- against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear 
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a 
physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”38 The Court’s decision that the reach of 
the Fourth Amendment is not directly tied to the occurrence of a physical intrusion into 
a geographic area, indicated a fundamental shift in the interpretation of the Amendment 
and resulted in a significant expansion of its protections of personal privacy.39 As 
Justice Stewart notes, once this core conceptual shift away from the reliance on 
geographic areas and physical enclosures is understood, the Fourth Amendment 
naturally enlarges to protect people based on a situational basis rather than a locational 
one. Therefore, a person’s words may be protected in situations where he or she has a 
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37 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-350 (1967) 
38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) 
39 See: Nicandro Iannacci, “Katz v United States: The Fourth Amendment adapts to new technology” 
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reasonable expectation of privacy, just as his or her private papers within a locked desk 
were previously protected by the trespass doctrine. 
Justice Stewart further expands on this new understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment by reasoning that an individual could knowingly expose information to the 
public from the confines of his home and that information would warrant no protection 
from the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, he explains that an individual may take steps 
to preserve the privacy of information, even when he is in a public place, and therefore 
he may have a reasonable expectation that such information is protected by the 
Constitution.40 Consequently, the warrantless use of the electronic listening devices to 
overhear conversations within what are assumed to be the private confines of a publicly 
used telephone booth constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure, thus violating an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against such intrusions. 
Justice Stewart’s opinion highlighted the role of technology in the Katz case and 
he embraced the opportunity to advocate for changes in the jurisprudence that would 
make the Court’s opinion relevant to the current society. He advocated for a living 
interpretation of the Constitution that incorporated changes, such technological 
developments, into the longstanding protections afforded by the Constitution, in this 
case specifically the Fourth Amendment. The underlying reasoning being that a living 
interpretation of the Constitution and the Amendments would ensure that the safeguards 
intended by the Framers would be maintained, even in an era that was witnessing the 
development of technologies that were unthinkable in the days of the birth of the 
Constitution. While examining the issues in the Katz case, Justice Stewart noted that the                                                         
40 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) 
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Court could not ignore the fact that the telephone had become an integral part of 
people’s lives and, therefore, its role in daily life deserved to be considered when 
interpreting the scope of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. He defends his 
position saying,  
A person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays 
the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that 
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the 
world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role 
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.41 
 
Privacy advocates continue to support this argument, arguing that interpreting the 
Constitution in a narrow manner, one which ignores the realities of technological 
development and the resulting societal changes, is to ensure the failure of its intended 
protections. The views that Justice Stewart expressed in his Katz opinion were pivotal in 
shifting the direction of privacy jurisprudence and succeeded in expanding the legal 
understanding of privacy rights beyond the earlier property based boundaries.  
 
Establishing the Third-Party Doctrine: External Actors 
Shortly after the introduction of the reasonable expectation test to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court developed another doctrine, this one 
specifically for privacy rights. The Court heard several cases that addressed the 
accessibility of information and the legal protections that existed for individuals seeking 
to maintain the privacy of their personal information. Through these cases, the Court 
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developed the third-party doctrine, which became one of the primary guiding principles 
of privacy law, alongside the reasonable expectation of privacy test.  
The third-party doctrine loosely relies upon the reasonable expectation test in 
that it helps evaluate situations in which a person may reasonably expect to control the 
privacy of their information.42 The third-party doctrine provides that if a person 
voluntarily shares information with a third-party, then the individual no longer has any 
legal grounds to expect to maintain the privacy of the information that was shared.43 It 
created a bright line test which provides constitutional protection for information that is 
never shared with a third-party, but removes any protection or warrant requirement for 
information that is disclosed to any other person or institution, regardless of the nature 
of the third-party or the purpose that the party serves in acquiring or transmitting the 
information. This standard means that government agents such as the FBI or the police 
can access information in many situations without needing a warrant.  
One of the first cases introducing the third-party doctrine was California 
Bankers Association v. Shultz, decided in 1974. In California Bankers Association, the 
Supreme Court addressed issues regarding the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Act 
required detailed record keeping of depositors’ financial records as well as compulsory 
production of such records upon request by government agents.44 In terms of privacy 
rights, the question was whether an individual could maintain a reasonable expectation 
of privacy over personal information that had been shared with an institution such as a 
                                                        
42 Michael W. Price, “Rethinking privacy: Fourth Amendment “papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine” 
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bank. The case was framed in such a way that it resembled the earlier Boyd case in that 
the government sought the compelled production of papers in hopes of proving a 
financial crime. However, unlike in Boyd, where the defendant was in possession of the 
papers, in California Bankers Association, the bank was in possession of the desired 
records. This then raised the question of whether the defendant’s Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment protections, the same protections that were affirmed in the Boyd decision, 
extended to personal information that was in the possession of the bank. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in California Bankers Association v. Shultz held 
that the personal privacy interests protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments do not 
extend to institutions such as banks, and therefore the government can compel even 
unwilling banks to turn over their records upon request, for the purpose of investigating 
criminal tax and regulatory activities, without violating citizens’ privacy interests. The 
Court determined that the Bank Secrecy Act does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure clause because the government can access the records only through 
existing legal processes and is not conducting an unreasonable intrusion because the 
records are held by a third-party rather than the depositors themselves. The Court also 
held that it does not violate the banks’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
because, as a corporation, banks do not have that right which is strictly reserved for 
people. This decision determined that the provisions of the Act did not violate the 
depositors’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the evidence 
would be produced by a third-party who has no interest against self-incrimination.  
Justice Thurgood Marshall recognized the challenges posed by the adoption of 
the third-party doctrine and authored a compelling dissent in California Bankers’ 
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Association. His dissenting opinion returned to the logic of the Boyd decision and 
condemned the majority opinion for being “wooden” and ignoring both the fact that 
current technological developments make brute force searches and seizures all but 
obsolete, as well as the precedents established in Boyd and Katz.45 He argued that the 
provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act were tantamount to a search and seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment for several reasons. His primary grievance was with the notion that 
individuals inherently forfeit their interest in the privacy of their information by 
disclosing it to a bank for a narrowly defined purpose within the confidential consumer-
bank relationship.46 He also disagreed with the majority on the grounds that their 
decision essentially allowed the government to bifurcate the banks’ record keeping 
process and the government’s inquisition process in such a way that effectively 
eliminated any privacy interests of the depositors.47 Justice Marshall contended that the 
Court had allowed the government to use the third-party doctrine to create a loophole 
through which it could easily access the personal financial information of citizens. The 
government created this loophole by enacting legislation requiring banks to fulfill the 
preliminary steps of gathering and recording the financial information of its clients, and 
then later compelling the banks to turn over the records against their will on the grounds 
that the information recorded by the banks had been cleansed of any of the depositors’ 
Fourth Amendment interests by the fact that the information was in the possession of a 
third-party. In summation, Justice Marshall asserted that the Court’s decision had used 
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legislation in conjunction with the third-party doctrine to unfairly strip the depositors of 
their Fourth Amendment rights.  
Justice Marshall’s dissent in the California Bankers Association case is the first 
to highlight what will eventually reveal itself as a fundamental fault line in the current 
jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment and privacy rights. The continued use of the 
third-party doctrine highlights the glaring inadequacy in the modern application of a 
dated doctrine. When broad exceptions to the protections of the law are made in 
instances such as this, more than just criminals are affected; all citizens become subject 
to government intrusion and the loss of fundamental privacy rights that are essential to 
their psychological and emotional wellbeing, as well as their identities as autonomous 
individuals engaged in the social and democratic networks of this country.48 This 
doctrine was adopted to help the courts arrive at consistent decisions when evaluating 
claims of Fourth Amendment protection, but it has significant implications, erasing the 
boundaries that protect the public from government intrusion.   
Justice Douglas also disagreed with the decision of the Court and offered 
another dissenting opinion that rings true decades later. Decades removed from this 
particular decision, his concerns have only increased in relevance today. He took a 
direct stand against the government’s claim that the collection of every citizen’s bank 
records was a necessary and effective means of investigating crime.49 In his view, the 
indiscriminate collection of every private citizen’s information was a gross overreach of 
                                                        
48 See, Woodrow Hartzog and Evan Selinger, “Obscurity: A better way to think about your data than 
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government power and he denounced the program as “unadulterated nonsense unless 
we are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an assumption I cannot make.”50 He aptly 
describes the government’s plan of mass record collection as a “sledge-hammer 
approach to a problem that only a delicate scalpel can manage.”51 Although Justice 
Douglas’ language was referring to the collection of bank records such as checks, it is 
almost directly applicable to the mass surveillance and metadata collection programs 
the government uses today. These programs also treat all citizens as if they were crooks 
and gathers their data without any prior suspicion of a crime, mirroring Douglas’ earlier 
fear of a “sledge-hammer approach.” This was a dangerous precedent to set and it is 
clearly continuing today in the form of even more intrusive programs. 
Later cases developing the third-party doctrine include Smith v. Maryland and 
United States v. Miller.  In Smith v. Maryland, decided in 1979, the Court further 
supported the third-party doctrine as the defining doctrine underlying privacy rights. In 
its decision, the Court said, “This Court consistently has held that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”52 The language in the United States v. Miller decision is even more troubling. 
The Court held that,  
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. This 
Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
the obtaining of information revealed to a third-party and conveyed by 
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the 
                                                        
50 California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) 
51 California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) 
52 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-744 (1979) 
 
 
26  
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third-party will not be betrayed.53 
 
This solidified a problematic precedent, effectively determining that individuals should 
have no confidence in any information they might be required to release to a third-party, 
even for limited and defined purposes. 
 
Using the Established Doctrines in Conjunction with Each Other 
 After establishing the reasonable expectation test and the third-party 
doctrine as the prevailing legal tradition in terms of settling privacy disputes, the Court 
was presented with privacy issues arising at the intersection of the two doctrines. The 
issue in Smith v. Maryland (1979) was whether or not the warrantless use of an 
electronic pen register to record the numbers dialed by a telephone constituted a 
violation of the dialer’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 54 The pen registers were 
installed at the central offices of the telephone company at the request of police officers. 
Therefore, the pen registers were recording data, in the form of the dialed phone 
numbers, that had been intentionally sent to the phone company by the person dialing 
the phone. Hence, the decision hinged on the two interconnected legal doctrines. First, 
does the telephone company qualify as a third-party, and therefore, does any 
information transmitted to it lose any Fourth Amendment protections? And secondly, 
does a telephone user possess a realistic claim to a “legitimate expectation of privacy” 
regarding the numbers he dialed into his phone? 55                                                           
53 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) 
54 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979) 
55 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979) 
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The Supreme Court decided against the petitioner, determining that the Fourth 
Amendment protects an individual only if the individual justifiably believes that the 
government has invaded his or her reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority of 
the Court believed that since the users of telephones regularly and voluntarily transmit 
the phone numbers they dial to the phone companies in the course of conducting their 
regular business, they have no reasonable expectation that those particular numbers are 
protected by the Fourth Amendment and are exempt from being shared. The justices 
concluded that users of telephones knowingly convey personal information to 
institutions, that the users know said institutions have the capability to record such 
information, and therefore the users assume the risk that said information could 
potentially be divulged to police.56  
As with California Bankers Association, Justice Marshall again disagreed with 
the majority’s opinion for several reasons. First, he took issue with the majority’s 
assumption that most individuals “typically know”57 that a phone company monitors 
and records the telephone numbers dialed for business purposes. He argued that it is 
unreasonable to assume that the majority of people operate with that conscious 
understanding.58 Second, he argued that the individual’s choice to voluntarily turn over 
that information in the course of conducting regular business with the phone company, 
if no reasonable or practical alternative exists, is not a valid reason to believe that the 
individual willingly forsook their interest in maintaining the privacy of that 
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information.59 This aspect of his argument rests on the notion that simply transmitting 
information to such institutions as a bank or phone company for limited business 
purposes is essential to normal daily function in modern society, and it does not 
automatically mean that one intended to accept the risk that said information would be 
released to other people, including the government.  
The logic of the majority opinion has proven to be substantially damaging to the 
real-world privacy expectations of citizens. In Smith, the majority articulated a two part 
reasoning: first, that information transmitted to an institution, such as a telephone 
company, for a limited purpose within the defined role of an essential function of 
modern society is not within Fourth Amendment protections; and second, that 
individuals generally understand when and where they are voluntarily transmitting 
personal information to a third-party that is not legally bound to preserve the secrecy of 
that information, and therefore cannot reasonably expect that privacy to be maintained. 
The precedent established in Smith and in Shultz indicates the Court’s belief that 
individuals ought to have a minimal or even nonexistent expectation of the privacy 
regarding personal information such as their phone records and financial records, 
despite the fact that there are few alternatives for individuals who wish to maintain the 
secrecy of such information. Seamlessly engaging with institutions such as banks and 
phone companies has become an essential part of our integrated society, and as a result 
there are very few alternatives for individuals who want to keep their information out of 
the hands of these third-party institutions. The issue of shared information has been 
compounded by the fact that institutions such as banks and cellular providers have                                                         
59 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) 
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collected increasing amounts of information that create the increasing possibility of 
developing a clear understanding of the personal aspects of their customers lives. In 
addition, the few alternatives that exist, such as strictly completing monetary 
transactions with cash or placing calls using only a prepaid phone that does not correlate 
to any personal records, are highly inefficient and often significantly more costly than 
the mainstream alternatives. This lack of realistic alternatives for conducting daily 
business in ways that ensure the secrecy of personal information is a substantial barrier 
to the realization of our rights against unreasonable search and seizure. It effectively 
acts as a loophole that ensures that much of our personal information is available for 
government access, under the illusion that a voluntary choice was made to relinquish 
the constitutional protections.  
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New Advances in Technology Create Problematic Privacy Scenarios 
 
Technological Advances and the Related Issues 
Over time, technology has advanced and new developments have become 
incorporated into our daily lives, dramatically changing the ways in which we share, 
store, and discover information. Advances in the capabilities of the Internet, personal 
computing devices, and global positioning systems (GPS) are some of the most 
dramatic examples. Today’s most advanced cellular phones are capable of monitoring 
location, storing photos and videos, and supporting countless social media platforms 
through which we share details of our lives and indicate our interests, social and 
political preferences, and hobbies. Cellphones are also capable of recording our contacts 
and all the information shared with them such as text messages, emails, and transcripts 
of phone calls. This wealth of information is not only stored on the cell phone itself, it is 
also recorded by external entities such as cellular and internet service providers, and in 
digital spaces such as the “cloud.” In addition to the data collected by cell phones, 
records are also kept of all browsing and shopping activity conducted on the Internet.60 
Whether it is recorded for advertising purposes or simply through the process of 
conducting business, this information is compiled and monitored by a third-party, often 
the cellular service providers or the internet service providers. Seemingly insignificant 
information such as Internet browser history or date and time records of calls and texts 
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can reveal very intimate and personal details that an individual has no intention of 
sharing.61 
The increasing capabilities of tools for information gathering and sharing, driven 
by technological advancements, have ensured a corresponding increase in the ways to 
intrude upon one’s privacy. These new forms of creating and managing information 
have given rise to a complicated network of players in the world of information 
services, each one independently collecting and distributing data, thus making it 
increasingly difficult to maintain privacy protections.62 As a result of these 
technological advances, invasions of privacy are no longer limited to the brutish 
methods of entering a home and searching through papers. Today there are far more 
covert ways for people, both government agents as well as private corporations, to 
search through the personal details of private citizens’ lives and acquire knowledge of 
their private affairs. For example, Internet service providers (also known as ISPs) are 
able to track Internet browsing patterns which often reveal information such as personal 
health concerns, religious views, banking and shopping patterns, political affiliations, 
and even sexual orientation.63 This information is usually collected under the guise of 
advertising purposes, but sensitive personal information such as this can be used in 
much more malicious ways depending on who possesses it and how they intend to use 
it. For example, personal information can be used to develop targeted political 
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messaging strategies which can ultimately affect politics on the national level.64 
Additionally, even if one’s personal information is not being gathered with harmful 
intentions, it is still disconcerting to have the details of one’s life so readily accessible 
by unknown individuals. 
For all their benefits in increasing efficiency and productivity, bringing 
unprecedented knowledge and power to our fingertips, and providing platforms for 
people to connect in new and innovative ways, the Internet and other technological 
advancements have arguably led to an effective decline in the privacy of individuals. 
The development of new ways for private citizens to communicate, store, and discover 
information and data have opened the doors for unforeseen means of government 
intrusion and surveillance. Information that previously would have been considered 
private is much more likely to be assumed as public in the current digital and social 
environment. New technologies have eased the means of discovering information that 
once would have been impossible to know without a clear violation of one’s rights. 
Technology has blurred what was once a clear line between public and private, and as a 
result citizens no longer enjoy the same level of privacy that they once did. 
The incorporation of new technologies into our lives has dramatically 
restructured the underlying foundations of our society, forging a now global community 
and connecting people in entirely new ways that encourage unprecedented levels of 
information sharing. The rise of social media has encouraged the voluntary disclosure 
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of life events, personal interests and activities, and political views. As people’s online 
presence grows, there is a corresponding decrease in expectations of an expectation of 
privacy. The more we share with the world, the less we expect to remain private. These 
changes in social behavior have created a problematic shift in the expectation of privacy 
by encouraging people to voluntarily relinquish their privacy without concern for the 
consequences. It is increasingly difficult to maintain a legal expectation of privacy in an 
environment where personal information is voluntarily made public. 
We live in an environment where the privacy of information is no longer 
guaranteed by the simple measures of a locked desk drawer or the confines of a private 
residence. The incorporation of technology into our daily lives has progressed to the 
extent that as members of modern society, it is impossible to conduct our daily business 
without using digital devices to some extent. Even without voluntarily sharing personal 
information on social media sites, using common devices such as cell phones, laptops, 
and credit cards comes at the price of leaving behind a detailed account of our personal 
lives that can be traced by the institutions that facilitate these services.  
The simple fact that all this information can be condensed onto a single device 
such as a personal computer or a cell phone, devices that are constantly recording and 
transmitting information as well as perpetually monitored by cellular networks and 
Internet service providers, presents enormous challenges with regard to maintaining the 
privacy of information. This effectively removes personal information from the physical 
control of the individual to whom it pertains; instead, placing it under the control of 
third parties such as corporations, who have very different legal obligations and 
protections than people. An environment such as this requires a legal and legislative 
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approach that relies less on the physical location and control of information and more 
on a comprehensive content based approach. These new developments in the 
transmission and storage of information expose the substantial differences between the 
law and the reality in which we operate today, differences that threaten the privacy of 
private citizens.  
The digital age and the ever-expanding technological capabilities of modern 
society have created the frightening possibility of government agents accessing all the 
intimate and personal information stored on a cell phone or computer; however, scary 
headlines like these often overlook the equally troubling aspects of more covert and 
passive methods of data collection. Access to a large enough sample size of simple data 
records, such as phone logs, purchase and search histories, and locational data points, 
can give police officers a detailed summary of personal aspects of life that can be just as 
revealing as actively personal notes, emails, or text messages. In previous decades, such 
information would have been considered impossible to know without the help of 
massive amounts of time and resources. Now, this information is easily compiled and 
accessible by government agencies thanks to advances in computing technology and 
cooperation with private sector companies such as Verizon, Apple, Facebook, Google, 
and Yahoo.65 In recent years, concerns regarding government surveillance of this type 
of data has made headlines, but there has been little judicial progress made in updating 
the guidelines regulating protections of this information. 
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When exploring this particular relationship between technology, society, and 
law, it is important to keep in mind the ways in which they affect each other. 
Technological advances are often incorporated into society far before legislatures and 
courts have a chance to review and evaluate these changes. Therefore, the courts are 
repeatedly in the position of reacting to the issues that arise as a result of these changes. 
As we are seeing in the most recent cases, the courts are being forced to apply legal 
precedents that were developed long before the modern digital era to issues that are a 
direct result of the astonishingly rapid and complex growth of digital technology. 
 
Sensory Enhancing Technology  
In addition to the narrowing scope of privacy protections, technological 
advancements have compounded the threat to privacy rights by enhancing the methods 
of conducting searches and increasing law enforcement officers’ ability to discover 
information without engaging in traditional investigative methods. Interestingly, these 
technological advances have ignited a revival of the debate of the trespass doctrine. 
There are a growing number of instances in which the once clear boundaries afforded 
by the trespass doctrine have been blurred or negated by the use of new technologies. 
New technological advancements have given law enforcement agencies the ability to 
intrude on private spaces without physically trespassing. In the current environment, it 
is harder than ever to define and protect private property even though that has long been 
considered the most straightforward of privacy issues. 
In the 2001 case Kyllo v. United States, the police used a thermal imager to 
detect unique heat signatures in the home of a suspected marijuana grower. Using the 
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thermal imager, the police identified hot areas on the exterior of the house that would 
suggest the use of high intensity lamps necessary for growing marijuana plants indoors. 
Based on this information, the police were able to obtain a search warrant to search the 
home, where they subsequently found marijuana plants and arrested the owner. 66  
The use of a thermal imager meant that the police could gain an understanding 
of the physical nature of the interior of the home without ever intruding on its physical 
premises or revealing any intimate details of the suspect’s life, thus, arguably avoiding 
any invasion that would constitute a violation under the Fourth Amendment. The police 
also argued that the thermal imager ought to be considered a simple sensory enhancer, 
and that, since the use of tools such as binoculars and flashlights were not deemed 
unreasonable, neither should the use of the thermal imager be so deemed.  
However, the Supreme Court held that the use of the thermal imager did amount 
to a Fourth Amendment “search” because the government used a device that is not in 
“general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion.”67 Justice Scalia, who authored the 
majority opinion, approached the issue with an originalist perspective68 and presented 
an argument in favor of acknowledging the original intentions of the Fourth 
Amendment and protecting these fundamental interests against future erosion by the use 
of new technologies by the police. Justice Scalia’s opinion offers strong support for the 
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protection of the privacy of the home. Using the logic applied in Katz, which declared 
that an eavesdropping device that picks up the sound waves leaving the enclosure of a 
phone booth is tantamount to a search and is therefore a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, Justice Scalia arrived at the conclusion that a thermal imager used to 
detect the heat waves emanating from a house must also constitute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. It is ironic, however, that he invokes the reasoning used in Katz to 
argue in favor of a continuation of the trespass doctrine, when Katz was in fact the 
decision where the Court first implemented the reasonable expectation test and 
intentionally departed from a strict reliance on the trespass doctrine. Scalia argues that 
to declare otherwise would “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the 
home.”69 While ironic that Justice Scalia would formulate his argument in such a way, 
he does make an important point in acknowledging the importance of advancing the 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to maintain the relevance of its protections in 
the face of advancing technology.  
 
Changes in Investigatory Strategies and Capabilities  
As technology has progressed, the government continues to utilize new methods 
of acquiring data that records the details of our personal lives. In addition to simply 
providing new tools and instruments with which information can be accessed or 
discovered, new technology can also compile and analyze unprecedented quantities of 
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data. These new advancements have removed the physical and resource barriers that 
used to prevent government agents from pursuing certain types of surveillance.70 The 
fundamental limitations of finite resources and man-power formerly ensured constraints 
on the government’s ability to track the private information of citizens. For example, 
the police could theoretically manually comb through countless phone records, financial 
transactions, and surveillance camera tapes to establish an understanding of the details 
of a person’s life, but due to the realistic limitations of available resources it was 
naturally assumed that this was impossible and there was little value in such 
information because it came in such large data sets that it was a fruitless task to attempt 
to make sense of it. However, technological advancements have exponentially increased 
the efficiency of these tasks and, therefore, enable government agents to record and 
analyze unprecedented amounts of data. Government agents can now gain insight into 
meaningful details of our lives from simple data records that may not necessarily 
contain any meaningful information in isolation, but when combined with thousands or 
millions of other data points, can create a thorough picture of one’s life.71 
Issues pertaining to police use of technology and the role technological 
developments have played in altering the way the police conduct investigations into the 
lives of suspects have been increasingly scrutinized in court cases. In 2012 the Supreme 
Court issued a decision on a case questioning the constitutionality of the warrantless use 
of a GPS tracking device to monitor the movements of a suspect. In United States v. 
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71 Anthony Barkow, “Symposium: A whole lot of Wurie: Information acquisition and the Fourth 
Amendment” SCOTUSblog (June 26, 2014) http://www.scotusblog.com 
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Jones, police attached a tracking device to the car of a suspected drug dealer without 
first obtaining a warrant and tracked his location for a month before arresting him on 
charges of drug possession.72 In light of these facts, the Court had to directly address the 
use of GPS devices in relation to the privacy of individuals. Ultimately the Court ruled 
that the warrantless use of a tracking device constituted an unlawful search and violated 
the suspect’s right to privacy by usurping his property for the purpose of gaining insight 
to his location.73  
United States v. Jones highlights the way that technology has changed 
investigative strategies and the new ways that insight can be gained into the private 
details of individuals’ lives. The suspect, Jones, was driving his vehicle on public roads 
and in full view of the public, so theoretically it may have been possible for a police 
officer to follow Jones and learn the same information that was transmitted by the GPS 
tracking device. Clearly, this tactic would be inefficient and made exponentially easier 
with the use of a tracking device, thus raising the important question of whether or not it 
is permissible for law enforcement officers to use electronic devices to gain information 
that could have theoretically been gained through other means, even though those other 
means are so highly inefficient as to be effectively impossible.  
The Supreme Court determined this to be a violation of Jones’ rights; however, 
members of the Court disagreed with regard to the reason why. The majority opinion 
was grounded in the belief that the use of an electronic tracking device on his personal 
vehicle amounted to a trespass on his property. Their reasoning offered a very narrow 
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decision that was strictly limited to the facts of the case and did not offer a broader line 
of reasoning that would indicate a change in the existing jurisprudence. Their decision 
effectively relied on the old trespass doctrine and ignored the opportunity to adapt 
Fourth Amendment interpretation to the norms of the 21st century in any scope beyond 
the most minimally necessary of steps.  
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito concurred with the majority; however, they 
disagreed with the emphasis on trespass doctrine because they believed this line of 
reasoning constrained the interpretationbg of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, they 
believed that the decision turned on the notion that the use of a tracking device violated 
Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy.74 This distinction in reasoning is important 
because it demonstrates Justice Sotomayor’s and Justice Alito’s belief in a broader 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and the protection of a larger sphere of privacy 
grounded in a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,” rather than simply a 
property-based approach. The concurring opinions of Justices Sotomayor and Alito 
offer encouragement that some justices are supportive of a more substantive shift in 
jurisprudence and that the issue may be revisited sometime in the near future. Their 
opinions encouraging the broader protections of an individual’s “reasonable expectation 
of privacy” may very well lay the groundwork for pivotal future decisions, just as the 
dissenting opinions of Justices Brandeis and Butler in Olmstead laid the foundation for 
the majority opinion in Katz. 
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Changing Norms and Altering Police Practices  
Technological advancements have encouraged new norms and practices that 
create a challenging environment for privacy. Practices such as consolidating important 
information into centralized and accessible means of storage such as in portable devices 
like cell phones and laptops or in digital spaces such as the ‘cloud’ mean that vast 
amounts of information are accessible at once. Information that once would have been 
distributed amongst any number of notes, files, books, offices, and homes can now be 
contained within a device that is in our pocket at all times. The police certainly may not 
access these devices at will; however, the information is neatly consolidated in one 
place and the law has had to adapt to account for this. It is essential that the law does 
not maintain a reliance on old understandings of privacy, and instead acknowledges the 
new ways that information may be accessed and privacy infringed upon. 
In 2014, the Court ruled on Riley v. California, a case which recognized the 
importance of cell phones and whether they deserve a higher standard of privacy based 
on the wealth of information potentially stored within them. The case addressed the 
ways in which cell phones might change the longstanding rule that allowed police 
officers to conduct a search of items found on a person’s body and within their 
immediate control during an arrest. The facts of the Riley case state that the police 
arrested David Riley in connection with possession of contraband and firearms that 
were discovered in the car he was driving. During the arrest, officers looked through 
images stored on a cell phone that was located in Riley’s pocket. A gang specialist used 
the photos and videos on the phone to determine that Riley was affiliated with a gang. 
Based on the images as well as ballistics tests from the firearms, Riley was charged in 
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connection with an earlier shooting incident. Before trial, Riley attempted to suppress 
the evidence regarding his gang affiliation on the grounds that it was based on evidence 
that was illegally obtained from his phone during his arrest and without a warrant. His 
motion was denied and he was convicted but was able to appeal all the way to the 
Supreme Court.75  
Riley addresses an important privacy issue with regard to the integration of cell 
phones into our daily lives and the limitations of search and seizure abilities of law 
enforcement officers. Previous case law stipulated that law enforcement officers may 
conduct a warrantless search of items on the body and within the immediate control of 
individuals during an arrest for the purposes of maintaining officer safety and 
preserving evidence.76 The officers reasoned that their search of Riley’s cell phone fell 
within the parameters of maintaining safety and preserving evidence. The Court, 
however, ruled in favor of Riley, stating that searching the digital data of a cell phone 
before obtaining a warrant satisfied neither the safety nor the preservation prerequisites 
and therefore violated Riley’s privacy. Perhaps most importantly, the Court 
distinguished cell phones from wallets and other items that are traditionally found in the 
pockets of arrestees because they are essentially minicomputers and contain 
unparalleled amounts of personal information.77 The Court recognized both the 
integration of cell phones into daily life, as well as their vastly different nature from 
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other personal items that may be found on a person during an arrest, due to their content 
storage capabilities. Acknowledging the importance of maintaining the privacy of 
devices that contain the most intimate details of our lives is a significant advancement 
of Fourth Amendment privacy rights by the court.78  
Although the Riley case produced an encouraging decision that indicates an 
evolving perspective by the Supreme Court, it was again a narrow decision and included 
exceptions to the warrant requirement in instances of an emergency. Like the Jones 
case, the Court failed to make full use of an opportunity to adequately advance privacy 
rights into the digital age and ensure the necessary protections for personal digital 
information. This partially reflects the incremental nature of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
but it also demonstrates a level of hesitancy and uncertainty with regard to the future of 
this particular area of law. As we have seen, it is changing at an incredibly rapid pace, 
and, as a result, it is difficult for the courts to anticipate and respond as needed. I believe 
that these recent decisions indicate a slowly increasing willingness of the Court to 
address the relevant issues involving technology and the role it plays in privacy. I also 
believe that the Court will need to issue more comprehensive decisions in the future, 
decisions that address the broader scope off privacy issues rather than the narrowest 
meaning of each set of facts if it is to keep privacy from being permanently crippled or 
destroyed entirely. 
Turning an eye towards the near future, the Supreme Court is set to hear a case 
during its fall 2017 session that has the potential to dramatically change the privacy law 
landscape. Carpenter v. U.S. addresses the significance of cell phone location history                                                         
78 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 9 (2014) 
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and the constitutionality of government access to this information through third-party 
cellular providers. The facts of Carpenter state that in 2011, police arrested four men in 
connection with a string of armed robberies. After the arrests, the FBI applied for orders 
from judges to obtain “transactional records” of the cell phones of each of the men 
arrested. Using the guidelines of the Stored Communications Act, the judges granted the 
orders and compelled the cellular providers to turn over records for each of the phone 
numbers.  
The Stored Communications Act dictates that if the government can use 
“specific and articulable facts [to] show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation” then it can 
require that providers disclose particular telecommunication records.79 Notably, the 
Stored Communications Act merely requires the officers demonstrate “reasonable 
suspicion” in order to gain access to the cellular records, rather than the more rigorous 
standard of “probable cause” that is required when applying for a warrant.80 The records 
spanned a 127-day period, including information such as the date and time of calls, the 
other cellular numbers involved in the calls, and the locational cell site information 
based on communication with cell towers in close proximity to the phone. The 
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locational records showed that the suspected robbers’ cell phones were within a half-
mile to two-mile range of the robberies at the times they were committed.81  
During the court proceedings, one of the defendants, Carpenter, moved to 
suppress the cell-site evidence on the grounds that the FBI should have needed to 
demonstrate probable cause and obtain a warrant in order to access his cellphone 
records. Thus, the primary issue of the case turns on the question of what level of 
privacy do cell phone records deserve? Because these records are simply non-content 
metadata and not actual content data, do police need to simply demonstrate “reasonable 
suspicion” in order to gain access? Or does this metadata deserve a higher level of 
privacy protection, similar to that of content data, because of the relatively new ability 
to compile a thorough and accurate picture of one’s life based on these data points? If 
we are to believe that metadata such as time, duration, recipient, and location points can 
convey a similar level of intimate personal knowledge as the content of the call itself, 
then the answer to the latter question is ‘yes,’ and it is imperative that it is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment and the requirement of a warrant.  
While it is clear that Carpenter presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity 
to address significant issues such as distinguishing the privacy interests of metadata and 
content data, changing the guidelines of the third-party doctrine, and determining how 
the Fourth Amendment applies in a world of mass surveillance, it is unclear what the 
Court will make of this opportunity. There has been expressed interest, by Justice 
Sotomayor in particular, in revisiting and revising the third-party doctrine, which offers 
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an encouraging outlook for the potential for significant headway to be made in this 
decision. However, this optimism is curbed by the recent appointment of Neil Gorsuch 
to the Court, ensuring the maintenance of a conservative-leaning balance of Justices. 
Carpenter v. U.S. promises to provide the opportunity for a landmark decision in the 
realm of privacy rights, potentially advancing privacy jurisprudence in a way that 
makes its guidelines more applicable to modern standards and increasing protections of 
technological aspects of individuals’ privacy. 
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Current Issues: Why are Privacy Protections Fundamentally Flawed 
Today? 
 
Balancing Security and Privacy: Surveillance and Privacy in The Post 9/11 World 
The foremost issue currently dominating the discussion of privacy rights in the 
digital age is the ultimate need to ensure the safety and security of the United States. 
The duty of the government to protect the country from threats both foreign and 
domestic has become increasingly difficult, and as a result, government agencies have 
implemented practices such as mass surveillance. These types of technologies and 
programs are new and relatively unproven, leading to fierce debate over whether or not 
they should be sustained. A troubling lack of transparency as well as leaks, such as the 
information released by Edward Snowden, have sharply increased fears of government 
misconduct and privacy concerns.82 Bulk data collection, including the collection of 
phone records, has drawn both strong support and fierce criticism. Supporters see 
technological developments as valuable means of increasing the protection of U.S. 
citizens and see no reason not to make use of all available advances to ensure that the 
United States maintains a security advantage. Critics, on the other hand, fear an 
irreparable trend towards minimizing privacy protections for all citizens in exchange for 
marginal gains in security. While these concerns are accurate and valid, so far there has 
been no record of abuse for personal or political gain.83 Conversely, there has also been 
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no evidence that bulk data gathering has directly led to the thwarting of any terrorist 
activities.84 
After the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the United 
States government quickly passed legislation called the “Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Adequate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001,” more commonly known by its acronym, the USA Patriot Act. This act of 
Congress, signed into law by President Bush in October 2001, greatly increased the 
surveillance power of the government in a frantic attempt to improve state security and 
combat terrorism. It allows the government to use surveillance tactics that include 
electronic monitoring and roving wiretaps, delaying notification of served search 
warrants, obtaining business records, and eliminating barriers that inhibited the sharing 
of information between the law enforcement, intelligence, and national defense 
communities. Many of these tactics were already used by law enforcement but on a 
much more restricted scale. The Patriot Act greatly increased the scope of government 
surveillance and removed restrictions that limited the use of such tactics.  
These increasingly aggressive methods of information gathering eventually gave 
birth to the Total Information Awareness program, which was, in the words of U.S. 
Senator and avid privacy advocate Ron Wyden, “the biggest surveillance program in the 
history of the United States.”85 Later known as the ‘Terror Information Awareness 
program’ the goal of this data mining program was to gather information about people 
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outside the United States as well as citizens on U.S. soil. The program sought out 
information on travel histories, credit card records, and medical records in search of 
patterns and signs that might indicate terrorist activity.86 A program such as Total 
Information Awareness was made possible by the significant leaps in surveillance 
technology and the lack of regulation or transparency between the government agencies 
involved and the general public. When the public discovered news of the Terrorist 
Information Awareness program, it was publicly shut down by the government in 2004. 
However, in reality it was secretly continued under different codenames and eventually 
re-emerged as an NSA program called Planning Tool for Resource Integration, 
Synchronization, and Management or PRISM. The problem with a program such as this 
is two-fold: one, it invades the privacy of American citizens by indiscriminately 
collecting their information without a warrant, and two, the secrecy of it violates the 
trust between the government and the people it is governing because the government is 
spending massive amounts of money on programs the citizens neither voted on nor 
knew about.87 Programs such as this are particularly damaging because they violate 
both the tangible and the psychological elements of privacy.  
A current and poignant example of the clash between security interests and 
digital privacy was the recent battle between the FBI and Apple over access to data 
stored on Apple’s iPhone during the course of an investigation into terrorist activities.88 
                                                        
86 “Pentagon’s ‘Terror Information Awareness Program’ will end” USA Today (September 25, 2003) 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com 
87 Chris Hayes, “Before PRISM there was Total Information Awareness MSNBC (July 2, 2013) ” 
http://www.msnbc.com 
88 Alina Selyukh, Camila Domonoske, “Apple, The FBI, And iPhone Encryption: A Look At What’s At 
Stake” National Public Radio (February 27, 2016) http://www.npr.org/ 
 
 
50  
The issue of whether or not it is a violation of the Constitution for the FBI, a federal 
investigatory agency, to compel Apple, a private company, to provide the government 
with a “back door” that bypassed the encryption security measures of the iPhone, was 
seemingly headed towards a monumental court battle in 2016 before being quietly 
dropped when the FBI found another way to access the information they sought.89 The 
news of the FBI’s request and the brewing court battle thrust the security vs privacy 
debate into the national spotlight, highlighting the role of private actors, security tools 
such as encryption, and the role that cell phones have played in altering our sense of 
privacy. Apple launched a very public campaign in favor of consumer privacy and 
against the development of a tool that would theoretically allow the government to 
access the information on any iPhone.90 Apple recognized the importance of the FBI’s 
security interests but expressed grave concerns about the risks of setting a dangerous 
precedent as well as removing the security features of a device that is used by tens of 
millions of people and are at the heart of protecting the vast amounts of personal 
information contained within the memory of the devices.91 Our cell phones and 
computers are often the single biggest repositories of our personal information and 
granting access to that essentially eliminates any level of privacy we seek to maintain. 
Finding a balance between national security and individual privacy rights is 
becoming progressively more complex, and the issues raised are leaving the existing                                                         
89 Shara Tibken, “Apple vs FBI one year later: Still stuck in limbo” CNET (February 17, 2016) 
https://www.cnet.com 
90 See: Tim Cook “A Message to Our Customers” Apple (February 16, 2016) https://www.apple.com 
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jurisprudence and legal regulations far behind. Many of the previously developed legal 
doctrines and constitutional interpretations are difficult to apply to the current 
environment. These challenges arise from the fact that technological advancements 
have changed fundamental aspects of our daily lives, including the ways we interact 
with others and the ways in which we share information. The existing legal doctrines 
establish guidelines and protections based on norms and practices that simply do not 
exist anymore. Current concerns must address issues that are significantly different than 
those that existed a decade ago, let alone over a century ago.  
In evaluations of the development of individuals’ right to privacy, the factor 
consistently balancing the other side of the equation is security. The courts must find a 
way to assess the equally legitimate needs of both the government and the individual. 
The government, after all, is tasked with protecting the security of the public, which is 
made up of individuals. Privacy must not be eliminated or irreparably crippled by the 
expansion of government surveillance. Conversely, effective means of protection that 
assist in the protection and safety of the nation cannot be ignored in favor of privacy 
concerns. A compromise must be made between the two fundamental needs in order to 
maintain the function and integrity of our democracy. The courts must determine the 
reasonable and necessary extent of government surveillance as well as establish firm 
guidelines that outline the protection of privacy that citizens may reasonably expect to 
rely on. Firm regulations and guarantees for transparency are essential factors for 
attaining a balance that does not infringe unnecessarily on the rights of the people.  
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Challenges of Keeping Legal Doctrine Up to Date with Developing Technology and 
Society: Why the Third-Party Doctrine Fails in Today’s Environment 
 
Changes in modern society demand that the courts either develop new privacy 
doctrines or evolve the interpretations of the existing doctrines in such a way that they 
accurately reflect the modern environment they are governing. Technology and society 
have undergone significant changes in the time since the development of the third-party 
doctrine and the reasonable expectation test. As a result, the existing jurisprudence 
developed by the Supreme Court does not accurately reflect the issues of privacy that 
are relevant today. The current law leaves citizens exposed to a variety of intrusions and 
in the words of Senator Wyden, “Outdated laws shouldn’t be an excuse for open season 
on tracking Americans, and owning a smartphone or fitness tracker shouldn’t give the 
government a blank check to track your movements… Law-enforcement should be able 
to use GPS data, but they need to get a warrant.”92 While Senator Wyden is speaking 
specifically about legislation, his message holds true for the Judicial branch as well and 
the Supreme Court must recognize perils of this situation in their decisions. Just as the 
Court altered its position in 1967 through the Katz decision, the Court must again 
recognize the significance of modern developments and actively evolve its 
jurisprudence accordingly. 
The advancements in technology during the last several decades have presented 
challenging scenarios for those seeking to support privacy law. The Supreme Court, a 
naturally slow institution that favors incremental progression rather than immediate and 
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broad responses to new issues, has been slow to demonstrate recognition of the 
shortcomings of the existing doctrines. Particular justices such as Justices Stevens, 
Douglas, Marshall, and Sotomayor, who have demonstrated a special attention to the 
threats technology poses for fundamental privacy rights, have expressed their concerns. 
However, despite the seriousness of their concerns, these scattered instances of prudent 
foresight have nearly always lacked the support of the majority of the Court. In those 
instances when the Court does deliver an opinion that supports privacy rights and 
protects personal information from intrusion, it is almost always narrow in scope and 
relies heavily on the Court’s incremental nature, following the given circumstances of 
the situation rather than the notion that a foundational shift in jurisprudence is needed.  
This is clearly seen in the narrow focus of some of the Court’s most recent 
decisions regarding privacy rights such as United States v. Jones93 and Riley v. 
California.94 In each of these particular decisions, the Court articulated bright line 
boundaries determining that particular actions such as placing a GPS device on a car 
and recording the locations it travels over a long period of time and the searching of the 
digital content of an arrestee’s cell phone during the arrest constitute a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. Although these decisions demonstrated support for preserving 
individuals’ right to privacy as intended by the original purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment, they failed to address the larger extent of the issue that expands beyond 
the narrow framework of the particular facts of the cases. And most importantly, the 
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Court continued to neglect the ultimate need for the introduction of a refreshed 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Just as the Court adopted the reasonable 
expectation test in the 1960’s as a way to recognize changing norms of communication 
and the integration of the telephone into daily use, the Court is again faced with a 
pressing need for a comprehensive change or addition to its methods of interpretation or 
application of privacy doctrine.   
The current jurisprudence focusses heavily on the situational facts of an incident 
rather than the particular information in question. For the most part, the Court has 
treated all types of information the same. Based on a rigid interpretation of the third-
party doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that information of varying levels of 
importance ranging from incriminating documents given to an attorney by a defendant 
(Fisher v United States95), to telephone numbers transmitted to a telephone company 
(Smith v. Maryland96), to personal financial information recorded by a bank (California 
Bankers Association v. Shultz97) all possess zero protection under the Fourth 
Amendment simply because of the common factor that in these situations the 
information is not in the hands of the individual who holds the privacy interest. This is 
deeply problematic because most individuals would almost certainly prioritize the 
protection of incriminating papers or even financial records over the numbers he or she 
dials into a telephone. It is both reasonable and entirely logical to prioritize the 
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protection of one’s personal information based on its value to the individual and the 
potential for harm should it be discovered and used for malicious purposes; however, 
this is not the current position of the Supreme Court. 
In theory, this doctrine has been a relatively good benchmark for establishing a 
person’s expectation of privacy because, logically, if a person is willing to share 
information, then they must not be interested in keeping it a secret. However, in the 
modern world, it is inadequate because it ignores of the basic level of information 
sharing that takes place through normal day-to-day activities such as online searching 
and shopping or communicating through text, call, or email. These are simple activities 
that most of us would consider essential in order to be a contributing member of modern 
society. The third-party doctrine’s assumption of a relinquished privacy interest by any 
individual who engages in these types of transactions ignores the modern developments 
that have connected the world in such a way that sharing basic personal information in 
this manner is a necessary, frequent, and unavoidable reality. 
 
Private Access vs. Government Access: Who Gets Access to Information and in 
What Situations 
 
In Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia engaged the increasingly important issue 
of the government’s ability to access information vs the general public’s or private 
entity’s ability to access information. In the Kyllo decision, the Court determined that 
the government should not be able to use technology that was not yet in use by the 
general public to learn previously unknowable information about a home — at least 
without a warrant. This is an important position to understand. Justice Scalia was intent 
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on ensuring that the government and its agents were not able to use new technologies to 
erode the protections of the Fourth Amendment.  
In the years since the Kyllo case, technologies used by private individuals or by 
particularly cutting-edge companies, have largely become more advanced than the 
resources of most police forces. Private individuals who follow our social media 
profiles are privy to our habits, interests, daily activities, and even our location. 
Companies such as Google know and record our online search histories, which can 
reveal any number of details or insights into who we are as a person. Cellular providers 
such as Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint have access to our calls, text messages, and location 
data. Online retailers such as Amazon have records of our shopping history and lifestyle 
preferences. These privately-owned companies record and store massive amounts of 
this data. Usually this data is used internally by the companies to improve the quality of 
their services and even tailor their service to the individual needs of each user.98 
Companies also sell this coveted data to advertisers who seek to increase the efficiency 
of their advertising and marketing strategies by targeting specific audiences based on 
indicators located in their browsing histories. As consumers, we have come to 
appreciate these improved and personalized services, but we often ignore the cost at 
which these improvements come.  
Even if companies are not tracking sensitive personal information such as 
medical records, religious preferences, or sexual tendencies, there are still unexpected 
and objectionable ways in which they can use your Internet history. Using a practice 
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known as “dynamic pricing” companies adjust their prices on the fly using software 
algorithms that take into account factors such as time, location, and competitors 
prices.99 Usually these factors are relatively benign and allow the companies to market 
their goods more competitive to consumers. Dynamic pricing is legal; however, it can 
quickly become problematic when there are also other lesser known factors that 
companies can track and use to target unsuspecting consumers. These often include 
browsing histories and even which browser an individual is using. The online travel 
agency, Orbitz, was recently caught up-selling their travel packages based on the 
browser the customer was using. It was discovered that Orbitz was displaying pricier 
hotel options to users operating Safari (Mac) over their Internet Explorer (PC) 
counterparts.100 101 Orbitz was doing this based on the notion that Mac users are more 
affluent than PC users and will therefore pay more for a hotel or travel package. While 
this is not entirely surprising, and not an invasion of intimate information, it highlights 
the ways in which private companies are tracking users’ online information and activity 
for profiling purposes that eventually lead to problematic practices.  
Increased private access to personal information becomes even more precarious 
when it expands beyond simply advertising and marketing purposes and beings to 
include information that has potential criminal, political, religious, or sexual 
implications. As part of an NPR series focusing on individuals’ digital trails and who 
can access them, a digital privacy specialist named Ashkan Soltani demonstrated how                                                         
99 Margaret Rouse, “Dynamic Pricing” WhatIs.com (December 2015) http://whatis.techtarget.com 
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changing social norms have encouraged information sharing and how private companies 
track this information.102 He created a fake account on OKCupid.com (an online dating 
and relationship website). He filled out their questionnaire, voluntarily offering 
information such as: gender, age, income, religion, ethnicity, political leanings, and 
even his alcohol and drug use habits. He then used two software programs (Collusion 
and MITM Proxy) which reveal that nearly 50 companies are monitoring his computer’s 
activity on the OKCupid website. According to Soltani’s software, not all of the 
companies were receiving all of the data, some were only tracking his age and gender 
information while others were recording all of his activity, including the information 
about his drug and alcohol use.103 Research says it is common for third-party companies 
to monitor a user’s activity across websites, effectively creating a visual thumbprint of a 
user’s online activity.104 105 While much of this information is used for marketing and 
advertising purposes and not for malicious purposes, it is fundamentally changing the 
notion of privacy because, regardless of the purpose, the information is held by 
someone other than the individual to whom it pertains. 
The problem is further compounded by the rift between private entities and the 
government, because security agencies in the government would like to have access to 
the same information that the private companies have access to but are limited by the 
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Constitution whereas the private companies are not. The question becomes, with regard 
to privacy rights, should the government be limited to the tools and resources that are 
considered within the general public use? The discussion is incredibly complicated, 
largely because the technological environment we are faced with today is very different 
than the one that existed less than two decades ago when Kyllo was decided and it was 
determined that the government should not be able to use technology or devices for the 
purpose of investigation or discovery that were not commonly used by the general 
public. Individuals in the general public and publicly owned companies now have 
increasingly high levels of access to the intimate details of our lives, levels of access 
that become troubling if the legal standard is to expect the government to have the same 
levels of access that are available to our peers or to companies.  
Since the 2001 Kyllo decision, technology has continued to develop at an even 
greater pace; companies have continued to integrate themselves into our daily lives and 
connect the global community in new ways; and finally, the security threats facing us 
have become more dangerous and more difficult to detect. In an effort to stay ahead of 
increasingly complex threats such as terrorism and cyber-attacks, government agencies 
such as the NSA and the FBI have developed massive surveillance programs, some of 
which operate in conjunction with private companies such as Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Apple. The government uses information compiled by these companies 
to monitor the general public.106 The cooperation between investigative government 
agencies and companies with which we voluntarily share private information in the 
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context of daily activities and narrowly defined business purposes is inherently 
troubling. It is troubling because the information we provide these companies is being 
used by both the companies and government for purposes that were not originally 
intended and in ways that circumvent our fundamental protections against unwanted 
government invasion.  
Distinguishing between government access and private access is an important 
step in curbing government access to personal information held by private sector 
entities. It is clear that private corporations have reached a level of integration into our 
lives that is well beyond the reasonable scope of government intrusion. Therefore, it is 
unreasonable and unconstitutional for government agencies to continue to have the 
same relatively easy access to the information compiled by these private actors that they 
have previously enjoyed. This is not to ignore the value of such information to the 
government agencies seeking to provide security for our nation, but it is to implement a 
necessary protection against the indiscriminate vacuuming of the information of all 
citizens indifferent of specified suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. The standard must be 
raised to that of “probable cause” and require the granting of a warrant before the 
government may request information held by private companies. This way government 
agencies may still conduct surveillance and access the necessary information, but on a 
much more defined and targeted basis. 
 
Psychological Dimensions of Privacy 
Privacy is primarily thought of in terms of as a tangible protection against the 
prying eyes and ears of those who seek to uncover information that some individual 
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desires to keep private; however, that is only part of what privacy entails. Privacy also 
includes valuable psychological aspects that are essential to the well-being of the 
individual, as well as fundamental in the bond of trust between a democratic 
government and its citizenry. The intrinsic desire for personal space and the peace of 
mind that accompanies the assurance that there are places and situations in which we 
are free from unwanted intrusion is important on both an individual level and on a 
political level. At the personal level, the ability of the individual to maintain the privacy 
of his personal affairs is central to the American ideals of individualism an autonomy. 
While at the governmental level, the bond between the government and the citizenry 
dictates that a reciprocal trust must exist so that each may fulfill its prescribed duties: 
the government’s duty to represent the interests and protect the rights of the citizens, 
and the electorate’s responsibility to legitimize government authority through free and 
informed decisions. The government must trust the citizens to exercise their liberties 
responsibly and respect their right to maintain privacy within their lives, or risk 
disintegrating the bond of trust and slipping towards a totalitarian regime based on 
power and fear. “It is the second area of trust—trust that the citizenry will exercise its 
liberties responsibly— that implicates the Fourth Amendment and is jeopardized when 
the government is allowed to intrude into the citizenry’s lives without finding that the 
citizenry has forfeited society’s trust to exercise its freedoms responsibly.”107 
Privacy centers around one’s expectation of having it, meaning that the 
psychological value of privacy relies on what most people can reasonably expect to be 
                                                        
107 Scott E. Sundby, “‘Everyman’s’ Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government 
and Citizen?” Columbia Law Review, 1751 Vol. 94 no. 6 (October, 1994) : 1777 
 
 
62  
private, or conversely, what most people expect to be public. This psychological 
expectation of privacy is exceptionally difficult to establish in an increasingly non-
private world. Simply put, “a Fourth Amendment based on expectations of privacy must 
contend with the changing nature of modern society. The very notion of the right to be 
left alone seems a bit tattered once placed next to the context of contemporary life… we 
may want to be left alone, but we realistically do not expect it to happen in any 
complete sense.”108 As news of government surveillance becomes increasingly 
prevalent, particularly after the leaks by Edward Snowden, American citizens have a 
growing expectation that the government is constantly watching their every move.109 
There is a recognizable shift in the psychology of Americans as a general acceptance of 
a widespread loss of privacy begins to take hold as the norm. This is extremely 
problematic in terms of privacy because a deteriorating expectation of privacy 
significantly damages its overall purpose.  
The implications of a change in privacy, particularly the psychological aspects, 
are harmful both to individuals and to government as a whole. A fundamental 
deterioration in people’s expectation of privacy creates a “chilling effect” on their 
freedom of association and intimate relations as well as their freedom of expression and 
action in both personal and political contextes. This effect was exemplified in a study 
examining the internet traffic patterns of privacy sensitive webpages before and after 
the Snowden leaks revealing the extent of surveillance programs such as PRISM. The 
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study concluded that there was a 30 percent drop in traffic for these sites after the 
disclosure of the government programs, thus empirically confirming the existence of a 
chilling effect.110 While this specific instance may not seem to have much importance, 
the larger implications are gravely serious. It confirms that knowledge of the 
government surveillance programs is directly related to a diminishing expectation of 
privacy and has a direct impact on the actions of the citizenry. This threatens to disrupt 
the bond of trust between government and constituency, resulting in significant political 
and societal implications. 
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Conclusion  
Adapting privacy law to the needs of the digital age is not simple or 
straightforward by any stretch of the imagination. It is clear that privacy is a complex 
concept that has evolved in response to societal changes and expectations. It has been 
influenced by legal interpretation, technological development, social integration, and 
psychological shifts in society. In recent years, pressures such as increasingly complex 
security risks and technological advancements that outpace legal doctrines have created 
an environment in which privacy is an ambiguous and precarious right. There may be 
no singular solution to the various faults in privacy law, but there are several specific 
steps that can help initiate movement in a direction that stabilizes the foundation of the 
right to privacy and establishes an adequate platform from which clear protections can 
be extended. A firm foundation and clear protections are necessary to ensure the privacy 
of individuals’ personal information, in an environment that increasingly encourages 
access to private information and personal details of one’s life. 
The Court must address the outdated doctrines and jurisprudence used to guide 
its decision making on privacy issues. Justice Sotomayor has already hinted in her Jones 
concurrence that she is ready to encourage the Court to revisit the third-party doctrine 
and refresh its view of that standard. In order to make the third-party doctrine effective 
in the digital age where personal information is frequently shared during everyday 
transactions and interactions, the Court must address the different types of information 
shared and in what context they are shared. The simple fact that an individual passes 
previously confidential information to a third-party should no longer mean that 
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confidentiality is immediately lost. This purely situational approach that relies on a 
bright line test is outdated and is ineffective in protecting the privacy of information.  
The Court must recognize in its future decisions that we as individuals are 
interconnected like never before, and therefore there must be elements of shared privacy 
between certain individuals or entities regarding particular types of information that are 
taken into account by the law.111 The law should be advanced to maintain the 
confidentiality of information shared within certain transactional contexts of limited and 
specifically defined business interests, such as health and financial information. Another 
approach might include recognizing differing levels of privacy based on the content of 
the information in question. For instance, the metadata collected by cellular companies 
such as the time and duration of phone calls, to whom the phone call was placed, and 
the location the calls were placed from may have a lower level of privacy than the 
content information, which would consist of what was said during the call or the words 
of text messages. However, this is a particularly challenging argument because given 
the quantity of metadata that can now be compiled and analyzed, it is possible for 
someone to develop nearly as clear of an understanding of another person’s personal 
information through metadata as they might otherwise develop by reading the content of 
personal messages. Records such as search histories and purchase histories present a 
unique challenge in terms of distinguishing between content information and metadata. 
This is because a search is unique in that it is not a communication between two people, 
but still communicates individualized information to a third-party. Each person’s 
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history is often extremely personal, and if collected over a long enough period of time, 
can reveal the most intimate details of their life such as sexual orientation, political and 
religious affiliations, medical concerns, and financial habits.  
Based on these concerns, the third-party doctrine should no longer be used as a 
tool by the government to gain access to people’s private records that they have no 
choice but to share with companies such as their cellular and internet providers, banks, 
or healthcare institutions. Instead, a comprehensive approach should be adopted that 
takes into account the realities of the integrated world we live in where confidential 
information is shared and should continue to maintain its confidential status. The 
removal of the bright line test, and the implementation of a balanced approach that 
recognizes varying levels of privacy based on the type of content or data as well as the 
context in which it was shared are necessary steps to take in order to restore protection 
and peace of mind to the average American. A failure to do this will continue our 
current trajectory down a slippery slope towards a total surveillance state in which 
average individuals are stripped of their privacy and autonomy and government 
influence reigns supreme — an environment not dissimilar to the dystopian world 
described in George Orwell’s novel 1984. The effects of such an environment on the 
psychology of individuals as well as the collective identity of the general population are 
ominous. That is why it is imperative that definitive steps are taken soon to reverse the 
trend towards increased government intrusion, and ensure clear legal protections for 
individuals’ privacy. Changing the outdated and inadequate doctrines in favor of ones 
that are consistent with the technological and societal norms of the current era is of the 
utmost importance.  
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Finally, the most challenging aspect of advancing privacy rights is balancing the 
security needs of the government with the privacy needs of the general population. 
There is an overarching belief that ensuring the safety and security of the nation is one 
of the foremost priorities of the government, but the important question remains, what 
level of government surveillance and infringement of privacy is an acceptable trade-off 
for increased security? The threats that face the United States are becoming increasingly 
complex, in the forms of both foreign and domestic terrorism as well as cyber-attacks 
that threaten our electronic infrastructure and the databases of important government 
agencies. In an effort to combat these threats, the government has engaged in measures 
to proactively detect and prevent suspicious activity.  
This includes increased surveillance and electronic monitoring of 
communications and information on a widespread scale. While reports claim that these 
monitoring efforts have been successful in deterring and thwarting numerous threats, 
they have also received heavy criticism for infringing upon the liberty and privacy of 
the people.112  
To effectively achieve adequate security, some level of surveillance and 
monitoring by the government is necessary; however, it does not have to be entirely at 
the expense of the privacy of the people. Increased transparency as well clear 
explanations of the intent of the surveillance and the guidelines for conducting the 
surveillance need to be laid out and adhered to, in order to maintain the trust of the 
citizens and to ensure that privacy protections are continued. This will likely take a 
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combined effort from the courts as well as the legislature. Action may take place first in 
lower level courts and in the state legislatures before reaching Congress and the 
Supreme Court.  
A potential solution is to implement varying levels of scrutiny for different types 
of surveillance. The government might be allowed to have relatively easy access to pure 
data information but demonstrate a higher level of suspicion and urgency in order to 
access content information. This would allow surveillance to continue, but with 
situational and content factors limiting what the government has access to and for what 
reasons. Allowing government agents to continue to monitor data and limited elements 
of communications by searching for suspicious keywords or communication patterns is 
essential to the function of agents protecting our safety, and it does not unduly infringe 
upon the privacy of individuals.  
Further investigation into specific suspects would require the government to 
demonstrate a higher standard such as a compelling interest or reasonable suspicion as 
well as a narrowly tailored scope of investigation. The goal is not to create an 
environment in which the government agencies seeking to protect the country are 
inhibited from doing their job, but rather to create clear guidelines within which they 
can operate, while removing the ambiguity as to individuals’ privacy and providing 
certain guarantees of privacy protection. 
This logic also applies to the increasing government partnership with private 
companies to gain access to and comb through the private records compiled by the 
companies. Companies such as Google, Yahoo, Facebook, Verizon, and Apple have 
become integrated into our daily lives and have access to far more personal information 
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than government agencies like the FBI have access to. Therefore, the government has 
used the third-party doctrine to gain easier access (requiring a subpoena rather than a 
warrant) to the information compiled by these companies by their users. This violates 
the privacy of the users because they did not convey the information with the intent of it 
being used beyond the scope of the narrow business interaction for which they supplied 
it. Apple has taken steps to fight back against FBI requests for the creation of a 
backdoor to the encryption code of the iPhone.113  
It is important for companies to follow Apple’s example and take a firm stand 
against government efforts to invade the privacy of their users. Of course, assistance 
from these companies is an important part of the government’s efforts to detect threats 
to national security early and prevent them, but there must be limits on the lengths that 
the government can go to in order to achieve its ends. Access to any information held 
by these companies should require that the government demonstrate at the very least 
reasonable suspicion, and perhaps a compelling interest in instances including content 
information. Investigations should also be narrowly tailored and clearly defined so that 
the expectations and intentions are unambiguous. 
Privacy is a core aspect of our fundamental needs as individuals and as a 
democratic society. We are a society of laws and we must advance these laws to keep 
pace with the changes and demands of the world we live in. Allowing our tangible and 
psychological value of privacy to be diminished by our infatuation with the latest and 
greatest technological advancement or the newest development in personalized service 
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or even the repeated promise of increased security is something we cannot allow. We 
must stand firm and defend our right to privacy because it is a fundamental legal right, 
an essential element of psychological wellbeing, and finally a core pillar of American 
ideology. 
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